




The nature of contemporary power is architectural and impersonal, not 
personal and representative
—The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends
THE SITUATION
In Arabic conversations, “the situation” (عضولا) is used to indicate prevailing 
political, social, and economic uncertainty.1 Those who use the phrase rarely 
specify what situation they are referring to. Has there only ever been one situation? 
The multiplicity implied in its nonspecificity binds one speaker to another in 
an implied assumption that is both intimate and collective. A former Baathist, 
Phalangist, Communist, or Pan-Arab Nationalist no longer. Not yet a martyr. 
Just a shared hesitation to speak the language of parties, names, and events. 
In their place, an empty term that stands for all possible parties, all possible 
names, and all possible events: “the situation.” Like an incantation, if you repeat 
it enough times, a million tiny acts of solidarity will add up to a collective per-
ception. Curiously, this affective precision is secured by the complete absence of 
content in the statement. “The situation” can literally refer to anything. Its task 
however is not to convey information but rather to forge agreement that the 
predicament is so self-evident as to require no further explanation—“it’s bad,” 
“we” are “in it,” “together.” 
This “we” is its work. Perhaps nothing forges solidarity like a shared sense of 
malaise. Perhaps it all depends on whether this shared sense is exhausted by its 
capture as malaise. In any case, whatever it lacks in specifics the term more than 
makes up for in scope. Indeed, the seeming inescapability of the situation colors 
every question and every judgment on the Arab city. Like the “Arab street,” a 
foreign policy term now used as shorthand to describe popular Arab sentiment, 
the “Arab city” appears perpetually aggrieved and inflamed. Undoubtedly, the 
fact that Arab identity, Arab cities, and Arab streets are constituted as certain 
kinds of problems, ones that command public interest, invite debate, and are 
worthy of discussion, cannot be separated from the multifarious geopolitical 
investments in the region. After all it is Arab identity, not some other identity, 
Northern edge of the Rachid Karame Fair and Exposition entry plaza, showing rows of unadorned 
flagpoles. The plaza datum directs visitors toward an inclined ramp and the entry pavilion.
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that is at stake here, and not only for Arabs, since the question has for some 
time merited discussions of a broader and certainly more pernicious nature 
within colonial states with respect to their former empires. The streets and cities 
of other communities are mainly matters of interest for those communities, as 
well as those whose job it is to be interested in such things; they are simply not 
burdened in the same way or by the same fears. To enter into this particular 
debate then, even as a strenuous critic, risks accepting its frame and reactivating 
the habit of posing questions according to these terms. 
How to proceed then? One might take “the situation” and the commonality 
of its use in everyday speech as a sign of caution and equivocation, a reluctance 
to betray positions or enter into public dispute out of fear of recrimination. But 
why insist on seeing this expression as a lack rather than an act of everyday 
resistance? Its compulsive repetition is evidence of an attempt to suspend rep-
resentation long enough to allow mutual sympathies to form. If the statement 
is not framed as lack, failure, or disavowal—and the suggestive ambiguities it 
offers are pursued—then another entry point into questions about the Arab city 
can become possible. This other entry point would not presuppose either of the 
two terms that guard its entrance, either “Arab” or “city,” let alone the colo-
nial legacies that mark the significance of their conjunction beyond the Arab 
world. So instead of starting with its refusal to specify, let us try to start with 
its function, which is to forge a collective sentiment. These sentiments, as artic-
ulated through the countless expressions of popular sovereignty that have been 
heard in the last few years suggest a nuanced understanding and sensitivity to 
the relations between implicit and explicit registers, as well as to the tension 
between affect and its capture through systems of representation. 
 After all, the implicit affective solidarity produced by 
 ةلاحلا / عضولا al-wad’a [the situation] 
can suddenly crystallize into a perfectly explicit revolutionary demand:  
‘بعش al sha’ab [the people]
‘ديري yurı¯d [want to]
طاقسإ isqa¯t. [bring down]
ماظنلا an-niz. a¯m [the regime]. 
I would like to examine the way that new collective sentiments are expressed, 
formed, and made explicit within contexts of social transformation. Architec-
ture has a fundamental role to play in these processes, and the examples cited 
above provide new insights into how we might understand the political func-
tion of architecture. Beyond an attention to the intrinsic precarity of these 
utterances is their urgent need to acquire a life beyond their performance in 
everyday conversation, to take forms that survive moments of “popular jubila-
tion,” as Jonathan Littell recently put it.2 When the chorus of voices falls silent, 
it is urgent to seize possession of all the passions of resistance, the investments, 
the sympathies, and the sentiments, and to finally discover what structures best 
secure their fate. It’s a question of desire: how to produce it, how to satisfy the 
demands that flow from it, how to secure this satisfaction into the future? 
Architecture has a fundamental role to play because it is able to contribute 
something essential to the durability of new social diagrams—an impersonal 
form. By stating that “the nature of contemporary power is architectural and 
impersonal, not personal and representative,” the Invisible Committee point to 
something that is growing clearer in leftist thought—the need for a constructive 
political architectural project.3 This is not to say that personality has nothing 
to do with politics, or that we are done with the significance of the face, or 
manners of speech, or charismatic leaders, but rather to indicate the way that 
contemporary forms of power cannot be understood without a serious exam-
ination of our imbrication in material and technical worlds and the subtle yet 
persistent solicitations these worlds make on life. 
To make this proposition more concrete, I want to draw on a moment in 
Lebanese history that was as unlikely as it was decisive. Commissioned by a 
proto-state, named after a zaim,(leader) designed by a part-time communist 
and full-time Carioca, the Rachid Karame Fair and Exposition project in Leb-
anon by Oscar Niemeyer is an object lesson in architecture and the problem 
of nation building. The project depended on the model of the state that gave 
birth to it, one that conceived of the nation as something plastic, one that 
reserved the right to intervene in that plasticity in order to shape it. But already 
by the 1970s, when an aggressive return to laissez-faire markets and the civil 
war interrupted the nascent movement toward a social welfare state, Lebanon’s 
political leadership was no longer willing or able to secure the conditions in 
which the project was supposed to operate. 
For many, the sense that individual projects fail to produce social transforma-
tion is troubling, if familiar. Maybe because it mirrors the secret presupposition 
that individual works effect social transformation in the first place. At the very 
least, it raises the question of architecture’s contribution to social transforma-
tion. In the case of the project in Tripoli, the failure to build a new Lebanese 
state, legitimate institutions, and a workable idea of citizenship makes broader 
questions regarding the instrumentality of architecture and its contingency 
within social movements more explicit rather than less. Still, this judgment of 
failure can only be made from the perspective of the 1960s Nahda, or renais-
sance, and its commitment to socialist, nationalistic, and pan-Arab programs.4 
A contrary position could be taken, that the inability to take a monolithic form 
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in a country without a hegemon was what lent Lebanon its peculiar ability to 
endlessly absorb regional pressures: not quite a state in any real sense, not even 
a peace—more a permanent, uneasy truce. 
In either case, nation building is an impossible burden for a work of archi-
tecture to carry when extracted from the political, financial, and institutional 
context that commissioned it, lent it sense, and struggled to sustain it. More 
useful than any appeal to Arab-ness, then, is to examine the concrete processes 
of experimentation in which social diagrams are produced and how the instru-
ments of modernity are taken up and modified, reactivating and mobilizing 
archaic structures like feudalism. By social diagram, I refer to implicit norms and 
explicit spatial and institutional forms that work together to produce, stabilize, 
and secure specific relations of power, including the production of national iden-
tity. In doing so, a more consistent, if transversal, genealogy can be cut through 
different claims for social change regardless of their periodization or their sup-
posed regional or linguistic commonality. By way of Niemeyer’s intervention in 
Tripoli, I propose that the diagram is what secures the operation of the work. It 
is what sustains the drive for transformation, what allows it to persist. 
Finally, I suggest that this work sets out to manufacture a certain kind of 
subject.  The era of nation-building projects was directed toward an imagined 
subject to come, one whose natural affinity to family and community had to 
be reoriented toward the promise of citizenship and national belonging. In this 
process, one kind of collective sentiment had to be replaced by another: famil-
ial, communal bonds would need to dissolve and national ones would need to 
emerge to take their place. However, there was a challenge. The nation did not 
exist. It would need to be invented. In the case of Lebanon, the reformist nature 
of this project meant that this transformation would take on an inherently ped-
agogical nature. The state would draw heavily on urban, infrastructural, and 
architectural projects to dissolve filiations at a communal scale in order to better 
establish it at the scale of the state. Exactly how this was supposed to be accom-
plished is a matter of importance not only because the era was such a crucial 
juncture in Lebanese history, one that belies the catastrophic upheaval soon to 
follow, but also because it raises questions of a broader disciplinary nature. 
THE DOME IN THE PARK
Returning to social transformation via this refrain, “the situation” requires that 
we distinguish between two different aspects: an interpretation that signifies 
some lack on one side (the inability to specify) and a direct intervention in the 
field of subjectivity between the speakers on the other (implying a common 
perception). One could say that architecture is still far too indebted to the 
first at the complete expense of the latter. In order to explain this and justify 
why it is relevant to a discussion on architecture, a digression through theory 
is necessary, primarily to differentiate between a signifying and a-signifying 
signs. This distinction, which comes from the work of Félix Guattari, refers to 
those signs or aspects of signs that exist prior to their formalization as meaning. 
Guattari uses the concept to break the dominance of structuralist linguistics 
and psychoanalysis on our understanding of the unconscious. With respect to 
the statement “the situation,” it works to mobilize certain kinds of passions prior 
to the allocation of positions or the articulation of identities. In fact we could 
say these substrata of affect become a kind of raw material for the subsequent 
Dome for experimental theater and music. 
Interior of the theater dome
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formalization of linguistic statements. The difference is crucial: the absence of 
the referent with respect to the meaning of “the situation” produces the condi-
tions under which a new referent (solidarity) can emerge. The condition that is 
being produced by the statement is nothing less than a small but precise inter-
vention in the formation of subjectivity itself. The concept of the a-signifying 
sign invites us to attend to processes of subjective transformation that exist prior 
to or alongside understanding—that is to say prior to or alongside of the rec-
ognition of meaning in signs. 
Acknowledging both the operational and semantic character of signs through 
this spoken example offers a way of thinking about architecture, especially the 
idea that  “intelligibility” should be the dominant mode of reception. Consider 
the example of the dome, a paradigmatic element within Christian and Islamic 
architectural traditions. It’s an enduring form whose resistance to transforma-
tion makes it particularly qualified to reflect the immutability of sacred and 
profane images of the cosmos. Think not only of churches and mosques but 
also of observatories and planetariums. Responding to historians Rudolf Wit-
tkower and Heinrich Wolfflin—who argued that dome of central-plan church 
was the ideal embodiment of Renaissance thought—the architectural critic 
Robin Evans suggests that, within the Christian tradition, these structures and 
the frescoes painted on their inside were evidence of nothing less than an archi-
tectural and artistic struggle to reconcile contradictory theological concepts of 
heaven and earth.5 After all, the heavens were composed of orbiting celestial 
bodies arranged in concentric spheres around the earth, yet all power—includ-
ing divine power—radiated out from a central point.  The dispute, as Evans puts 
it, was between envelopment and emanation. Each position embodied distinct 
and sometimes antagonistic social, theological, and political claims about the 
location of God with respect to man.  According to Evans, the achievements of 
Brunelleschi or Raphael lay in their ability to literally give form to the con-
tours of this dispute by bringing these differences into proximity and holding 
them in a space of coexistence. Somewhat perversely, when it comes to domes, 
the very recalcitrance of their geometries has only encouraged rather than lim-
ited this kind of interpretation and speculation. For Wittkower and Wolfflin the 
dome embodied perfection while for Evans it embodied dispute. Yet all agreed 
that the dome must be interpreted. What was at stake was never signification as 
such, only what was signified. 
Indeed Wittkower, Wolfflin and Evans might well be justified in framing this 
problem in terms of codings and decodings of meaning insofar as such framing 
describes how the work was often reasoned by its authors and received by its 
audiences. The legacy of this question and its hold over contemporary accounts 
of architecture is of more concern. The issue of Arab identity and its architec-
tural representation is a case in point, since it is still posed in terms of tropes and 
their representational adequacy. So the debate around domes or even the prob-
lem of appropriate and inappropriate orders now persists with  meshrabiyeh, 
geometric tiling, pointed arches, and vaulting are deployed to signify “Islam” 
or “Arabness” along a spectrum ranging from very subtle and discreet (good) 
to vulgar and kitschy (bad). Consider the Lebanese Pavilion in the Rachid 
Karame Fair and Exposition site: a square-plan, open auditorium framed by a 
colonnade using a pointed arch. Most will recognize that this particular form 
refers to Ottoman traditions, of which there are many examples in the area. 
Some will not grasp the allusion, however, since the sign’s legibility is dependent 
on the observer’s prior knowledge. I happen to like the arches; others will find 
them unadorned, and most will probably pay them little attention. In any case, 
the form is supposed to signify cultural belonging and history.6
Architecture works on us and through us regardless of whether we “get” it, 
regardless of its intelligibility, and regardless of our capacity to appreciate its 
tropes or derive pleasure from their modification. This is an important political 
point; at stake is nothing less than a claim about what architecture does outside 
of architectural discourse—what it does to nonarchitects. Buildings are pri-
marily nondiscursive objects even if they are always ensnared in discourses of 
every kind. This is why the concept of the diagram is so relevant here. It allows 
us to place the nondiscursive, a-signifying aspects of architecture into relation 
with the discursive, signifying aspects—architecture’s instrumentality is always 
bound to the nonarchitectural.  Diagrams are not manifested literally as specific 
tropes, or even as systems of organization. Neither the pilotis, the free plan, the 
New York frame, or the Dom-ino are diagrammatic in and of themselves, nor 
can they be ever considered in purely architectural terms, whatever that might 
mean. They only act on the social body as intended when they are secured 
by  a constellation of cultural attitudes, laws, customs, regulations, and other 
requirements. The discursive and nondiscursive elements work together within 
any diagram. The panopticon would simply be a damp, round building with a 
tower in the middle without the transformation of penal codes, prison reform 
movements, the judiciary, and a police force. The modern domestic unit would 
just be an odd way of strategically segregating and bringing together bodies 
without the “charitable” incentives of philanthropic organizations, the regular 
assessments of housing inspectors, or instruction manuals for poor families. Do 
prisoners or members of a nuclear family need to recognize these histories in 
the disposition of rooms and arrangement of functions? Will the disposition of 
rooms and arrangement of functions cease to act on their habits, pattern their 
socialization, or structure their gender roles if these histories are unintelligi-
ble? In other words, absent an understanding of its sociopolitical motive, will the 
prison cease to shape them as certain kinds of human subjects? 
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To answer this, consider another dome. In the northern Lebanese city of 
Tripoli, in the park-like Rachid Karame Fair and Exposition site, there is a 
dome that wears its dereliction a little better than the buildings around it. Some 
62 meters wide, its slightly squat, not quite hemispherical shape gives little away. 
Only the acoustics and the sunken orchestra pit inside betray its uniqueness. The 
dome was supposed to be a venue for experimental theater and music, a pro-
gram that makes it possible to calibrate the precise distance between the present 
situation in Lebanon and the past situation in Lebanon. 
Back when it was still called the Syrian army and not yet “the regime,” 
thousands of soldiers were stationed in temporary barracks alongside the dome. 
These days, because of the situation, only the especially curious venture in. A 
one-hour drive from Tripoli will take you to the top of the Lebanese ranges, 
where you can look out to what used to be Syria and listen to the sounds of 
shelling from the Qalamoun Mountains across the Bekaa Valley. From either 
vantage point, the sense of resignation is hard to shake. Nevertheless, these lost 
modernities deserve closer scrutiny. If a system of subjectification was built 
into the fair and exposition, it is worth asking exactly what kind of techniques 
would be addressed to the bodies and characters of those meant to populate 
the project? What was specific about architecture’s contribution to the project 
of nation building during this period? Is it possible to account for the imagined 
instrumentality of the project without relying exclusively on a semantic inter-
pretation of its tropes? 
TECHNOLOGIES OF NATIONHOOD
The exposition type played a critical role within nation-building projects 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, exemplifying concepts of cit-
izenship and cultural belonging. The Rachid Karame Fair and Exposition site 
draws on this history, especially its appropriation during the postcolonial era. 
Surrounded by a four-lane road and nestled in the elbow of a freeway con-
necting Tripoli to Beirut, the 1.1 kilometer long elliptical site might pass for 
the world’s largest roundabout were it not for the occasionally beguiling struc-
ture poking past the canopy of trees. The exposition and fair facilities occupy 
maybe one-third of the site, with the rest set aside as an imagined parkland for 
the metropolis that never materialized around it. The 750 meter long expo hall 
is the most dominant element. To its east lie pavilions set in gardens, most of 
which were intended for some form of ongoing cultural production.
Commissioned in 1962, the project depended on the brief appearance of 
something resembling a social welfare state, in which large-scale public works 
were seen as integral to perceptions of political legitimacy and therefore to 
nation building. By the 1970s, however, pan-Arabism, which first came to prom-
inence with Nasser’s regime in Egypt and Gaddafi’s proposal for a Federation 
of Arab Republics, was on the decline. This indicated a regional shift away from 
secular and socialist principles toward sectarian political alignments. Military 
defeats and economic stagnation contributed to widespread discontent in the 
Arabic-speaking world. In Lebanon, the contraction of the state, the withdrawal 
of government from social services, and an inability to implement electoral 
reforms or build stable institutions coincided with the extreme regional desta-
bilizations occurring as a result of the conflict between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), now operating from Lebanese bases.
Most exposition histories focus on the organization of the exhibitions and 
the strategies used to order, represent, and juxtapose different cultures. At times, 
scholars will turn to the technical innovations used in the construction of the 
exposition hall or within the exhibits themselves. Niemeyer’s proposal for Trip-
oli is different from the prototypical world’s fair or international exposition in 
that it combines an exhibition hall with buildings dedicated to cultural pro-
duction within a landscaped urban complex that was intended to be used as a 
model for structuring the growth of a city.  These four elements—the exposition 
hall, the cultural pavilions, the park, and the urban plan—should be understood 
as complementary components within a nationalistic, pedagogical project. 
There are two main forms of movement through the site corresponding to 
the linear organization of the exposition hall and the placement of the pavil-
ions. Niemeyer constructed a series of ramps and elevated vantage points that 
encourage visitors to continually withdraw from the mass and survey the crowd 
before returning back down to the ground. Here, the crowd could see itself seeing 
and being seen. Outside of protests and demonstrations, organized public gath-
erings of this scale were unprecedented, and the effect of finding oneself caught 
in this reciprocal spectacle would have been quite powerful. Being shaped here 
was not just architecture; that architecture forged an audience that could, in the 
vastness of its own spectacle, become self-aware. 
As Lebanon urbanized during the colonial period, asabiyyah (an Arabic term 
referring to social cohesion within a community group) and feudal familial ties 
that had traditionally structured sectarian belonging persisted in response to a 
highly competitive capitalist environment and the insecurity such an environ-
ment produced. Old networks of patronage remained important in the absence 
of a legitimate state able to insure the poor against the difficulties of urban 
life. In Lebanon, metropolitan anonymity did not dissolve feudal or familial 
bonds; it re-territorialized them and made them stronger. For a brief decade 
between the mid-1950s and 1960s, however, a concerted attempt was made to 
dissolve these links in order to establish them on new and different terms. The 
project in Tripoli is part of this history. Its organization manifests an attempt 
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to orchestrate a set of affects and feelings of belonging that, when inscribed in 
dominant narratives of nationhood, would become untethered from their com-
munal histories. 
One can see the project as a machine designed to produce new relation-
ships between the crowd and the individual, and therefore the nation—a mass 
orchestration of affect. However, the surplus of affect produced by the specta-
cle of the crowd that Niemeyer orchestrated through the ramps and vantage 
points would as yet remain undifferentiated, little more than a mass gripped by 
various existential intensities and feelings. This unformed set of affects there-
fore had to be captured and assigned a proper location within the social order. 
The crowd recently decoded must be recoded, classified, and naturalized within 
a national narrative. The exposition hall and the display of “characteristic” 
elements from the various nations assembled would inform the normalization 
and stabilization of a new Lebanese identity. Visitors would learn to distinguish 
themselves as citizens by acquiring new rules of public conduct, especially the 
consumption and appreciation of cultural artifacts.
Ordering the world into an image, as Timothy Mitchell puts it in his 
description of the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1889, produces two effects: 
first, a representation of national difference and, second, the extension of a 
colonial system of representation into the world itself.7 In Tripoli, the mass pub-
lic organization of the crowd and the relation of the individual’s vantage point 
within it draw on the typological history of the international exposition and 
its curatorial organization. Through arranging encounters with artifacts, the 
fairground would have attempted to recode this undifferentiated population in 
order to define Lebanon’s newly won place among other nations. In addition 
to exposition planning and exhibition design, Niemeyer introduces a third ele-
ment: the pavilions for cultural production and performance. These pavilions 
locate the citizen in a position of imagined ownership over the products of 
cultural activity. 
We might imagine the components of the fair working together to achieve 
the following ends: The subjects’ communal bonds are confronted by some-
thing new—an orderly mass public spectacle, in which the subject undulates 
into and out of the mass producing a charge of affect that is not yet formal-
ized. The consumption of the artifacts within the exhibition positions them 
in the world through a national narrative, until finally they are led to see 
themselves as the imagined producers of this national narrative. This is what 
the architectural machine accomplishes within the social diagram. The first 
component of the machine operates using a-signifying signs. The ramps and 
changes in height are not symbols to be interpreted; they intervene directly in 
the subjective field. Only later do the elements collaborate to produce signs 
whose meaning must be read. However, the precondition of meaning in the 
sign is the visceral charge produced within the subject. This representation 
of nationhood can only operate insofar as it can recode and formalize this 
substratum of affects and passions the spatial qualities of the project produce.  
However, this a-signification was only the architectural aspect of the diagram. 
The larger pedagogical ambition depended on more than the designs build-
ings have on human nature. They depended on a state that was willing to see 
itself as the architect of this national narrative, one in which these kinds of 
large-scale infrastructure projects were secured and oriented to specific ends 
through forms of cultural administration, curatorial strategies, exhibition pro-
grams, and the media. The weakness of the state meant that the pedagogical 
diagram and its technologies of nationhood did not stabilize before the onset 
of civil war in 1975.
AFTER THE REGIMES
Those who refuse to wean themselves off an enthusiasm for politics 
project insurrections without end, powers constituent but never consti-
tuted, interruptions that are never the prelude to less abject continuities.
—The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends
Of the many outcomes of “the situation,” perhaps the most accepted is the 
conflation of destruction and reconstruction. Revenue from luxury apartments 
will shower down upon those who broker peace. In war, land speculation 
makes a joke of military calculus. Soon enough, the rhetoric of imminent 
futures promised in renderings of a new Aleppo or a new Damascus will dou-
ble, albeit in an architectural register, the present legacy of violence through 
systematic destitution and dispossession. Before these images of cities to come 
have acquired their final touches, however, the future they depict will have 
been engineered into existence through land expropriation and models of real 
estate speculation, through promissory notes based on calculations of future 
revenue according to reliable standards and estimates of return. Untethered 
from the realities of existing land tenures, undisciplined labor markets, and 
unpredictable steel prices, they will reach purely speculative heights. Like the 
images of many urban futures, those destined for the “Arab world” will need 
to become standardized before they can be bankable—the recent images from 
a design for a city of seven million people between the Suez Canal and the 
shores of the Nile being a case in point. Like a bushel of wheat or a barrel of 
oil, the urban future has become a standard measure. Its consistency, its ubiq-
uity, and its reliability are what allow it to circulate. It is not surprising that 
promised cities act like commodities: in one sense, that is increasingly what 
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they are. The future has to learn how to flow. Its promise has to become liquid 
before it can become solid. As with grain and oil, too many inconsistencies 
leads to friction. 
Despite the inherent conservatism of real estate markets and the dispirit-
ing reliability of these propositions, their colonization of imaginations is far 
from complete. There is no lack of discontent toward—or critique of—these 
propositions within architectural discourse, and certainly no lack of emotional 
investment in alternative futures for Arab cities and Arab streets. In Aleppo, in 
Amman, in Beirut, in Cairo, in Damascus, in Gaza, and in Jerusalem, there 
are the most startling signs of political experimentation, social movements, 
activism, and institution building. There are, in other words, signs of survival, 
resistance, and invention to be found everywhere. From experimental coalitions 
on human and natural rights in Lebanon to proposals for democratic federal-
ism in Southeastern Anatolia, from feminist movements in Kurdish communities 
to autonomous neighborhood assemblies in beleaguered Syrian cities, we see 
brave and vital attempts to reimagine social ties and forms of political organi-
zation. But without access to the equivalent of what Timothy Mitchell describes 
as the future’s “engineering works,” it is difficult to imagine how these precious 
experiments of alternative social orders can be sustained.8 Discontent, critique, 
and desire alone will not be enough to turn aspirations into reality, because the 
various systems of calculation and capitalization that drive real estate develop-
ment have a particular kind of durability. 
The aversion toward “social engineering” within architecture or urban 
design has not resulted in societies that lack “engineering,” let alone societies 
that are more perfectly ordered. On the contrary, the result is simply societies 
whose order and engineering have been dictated by those who have access to the 
future’s infrastructure, leaving the rest condemned to precarity. The persistence 
Rendering of masterplan for Capital Cairo, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, 2015.
Dome for experimental theater and music, and Lebanese National Pavilion.
and dominance of these conditions is often described as “neoliberalism,” but 
this term fails to capture the specificity or diversity of the many socioeco-
nomic diagrams that it is said to encompass. Moreover, it misses the fact that 
it is precisely these different socioeconomic structures that normalize processes 
of subjectification. The stability of the links forged between foreign capital, 
real estate speculation, and the domestic unit, for instance, works to ensure 
the reproduction of social and political power in urban space. The elements 
that compose these diagrams—their links, their ability to persist in time, repeat 
in space, and shape forms of subjectivity—cannot be reduced to matters of 
representation and interpretation. Financial calculation, debt, and living and 
working arrangements secure their own reproduction because they appear as 
sets of norms, material constraints, and habits that function regardless of the 
meanings or interpretations that critics assign to them. 
Perhaps the people that were supposed to inhabit the fair site in Tripoli 
ended up materializing fifty years later in the streets and squares of other cities? 
These crowds, recently gathered and too quickly dispersed by brutal count-
er-revolutions, insist that we question assumptions about the durability and 
stabilization of new social orders. The contingency of architecture with respect 
to these orders suggests a more careful examination of histories of subjectifica-
tion as a pedagogical project. Such an inquiry would not simply entail escaping 
from signification but rather describing the feelings, codings, and structures in 
which signifying and a-signifying elements cooperate within a political project. 
The institutionalization of social movements might be one place to start, and 
architecture’s impersonal form might have much to contribute. After all, when 
regimes are brought down and after the people have expressed their demands, 
new kinds of structures to support new habits of life are needed if legacies of 
social transformation are to be kept alive.
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